Persistence of the Self

Persistence of the self over time occupies one of the most interesting subjects for debate in philosophy and religion, although one which is typically taken for granted in Judeo-Christian culture. The focal point of this discussion is between ego theories (strict identity over time) juxtaposed with bundle theorists (identity is only a series of experiences). In Western culture at large most people staunchly endorse ego theories of the self. In this case, what makes the self “me” is not a series of thoughts, but rather an underlying persisting substance which is a container for thoughts. This container is what unifies my perceptions together so that I recognize not only thought, but that “I” exist. (I think, therefore I am) Put bluntly, most people regard this unified self or container as a “soul”. The questioner asks, “Who am I really?”. And the Christian answers, “What makes me myself is the eternal soul.”

But on the other side of the coin, is an equally compelling answer given by bundle theorists. Hume was the first prominent bundle theorist in Western culture who argued that the self is not composed of an underlying soul, but rather is only a series of experiences in the certain causal relation of memory. This is also the Buddhist conception of the self as part of “dependent” arising. Buddha wrote: "This bundle of elements is void of Self. In it there is no sentient being. Just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the name of fancied being. Buddha has spoken thus:...There is no Individual. it is only a name given to a set of elements."

Thus, this does not deny that there are persons, but simply argues that a person is an assemblage of sorts. Just like the carriage has no fundamental existence outside of its particular arrangement, the concept of the person depends on its parts, mind and body. We are nothing more than our brains and our bodies, but identity cannot be reduced to either. This is similar to the way the logical atomists, in the philosophy of language, seek to reduce objects to their constituent parts in order to illustrate the most fundamental substance of reality. For instance, a table does not exist as an independent entity above the way a board and a stump sit in a particular configuration. The word “table” just is what we have used to call the configuration of its parts, which then can be reduced even further. The table's existence requires "conceptuality" and therefore is nominal. Logical atomists are no doubt influenced by scientific inquiry, which attempts the same reductionism. For instance, “solidity” is simply the arrangement of molecules in a certain way, and “color” is only the refraction and absorption of certain waves of light. (Notice the scientific materialist view of the self as merely a complex machine therefore fits in well with the bundle theorist account)

Similarly, the contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit endorses the bundle theory of the self by positing that there are feelings, thoughts, experiences, and the causal relationship between them but nothing more. The fundamental question is not of identity, but rather of continuity of experience. “I think therefore I am” cannot be concluded on the basis of a concept of personhood which does not entail an underlying self. For Parfit, people are like clubs-

"Does the Maryland Philosophy Club exist as a thing in its own right? The answer would seem to be no. For there to be a Maryland philosophy club is nothing more than for there to be certain people who have decided to associate with one another for certain purposes and talk about that association in a particular way. The club has no individuality or integrity in its own right. Or again: at the moment, there is on my desk at home a rather outdated and bulky modem, on top of which is a bottle of vitamin E, an aluminum can and a bowl with a spoon and a bit of ice cream residue in it. Suppose I give this collection of objects a name, calling it "Modemess." Does "Modemess" exists? The answer is on the one hand obviously it does. There is the modem and the junk on top of it; no doubt about that. But does it exist as a genuine, unified object? Its existence is surely nominal -- that is, a result of nothing more than the separate facts about the individual objects together with the fact that I have decide to give the lot of them a single name.” (http://brindedcow.umd.edu/308x/parfit.html)

Thus, any talk of the “self” for a bundle theorist is like the carriage or club, nominal or name-only. What matters is not identity, but the psychological continuity of my memory. This has the striking result that when my memory is gone, I am literally no longer the same person. Thus if one endorses this theory, we must be prepared to say of a person who has severe Alzheimer’s that they have not only merely forgotten, but they are literally no longer themselves.