If causal determinism is true, such desire is in itself caused by an infinitely long chain of antecedent events back perhaps to the hand of God leading to its inevitability. And of course, we then do not have any free will, and the word “choice” has no real meaning. Thus, someone who exhibits only these first-order desires cannot be said to be an agent in the strict sense of the word. This is because in this situation our beliefs and desires are causally-sufficient reasons for action. This would include animals, small children, perhaps the mentally insane, and those who are blind addicts. (What Frankfurt calls animals and children “wantons”)
But what if I choose the latter? I’m I acting as an agent if I choose that which goes against my desire? Suppose I choose the chicken sandwich, have I done so with absolute free will? What if I desire both equally? It would seem that freedom, at least in the compatibilist sense, is established when I override my original desire. This would be a second-order choice which supersedes my innate desire. (Or perhaps If I choose my original desire it is because of a period of self-reflection and not because I was led by a craving) In this case, my original desire is not causally sufficient for action. I have the possibility for self-reflective action. This seems to me intimately connected to the concept of duty. In such cases we resist our first-order desire by acting according to a sort of universal principle or ideal. (i.e. A priest chooses to live a life of asceticism despite innate passions) Thus, second-order desires give rise to freedom of action which leads to the possibility of morality.
Second Order Desires Can be Considered as:
“Higher-order volitions (or higher-order desire), as opposed to action-determining volitions, are volitions about volitions. Higher-order volitions are potentially more often guided by long-term convictions and reasoning. An example for a failure to follow higher-order volitions is the drug addict who takes drugs even though he would like to quit taking drugs. According to Harry Frankfurt the drug addict has established free will, in respect to that single aspect, when his higher-order volition to stop wanting drugs determines the precedence of his changing, action determining desires to either take drugs or not to take drugs. Following this definition the establishment of free will is a continual challenge with a changing degree of difficulty. This view of free will conforms with compatibilism.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher-order_volition)
We might say a person who then acts according to a moral law but then gives in to his desires, has fallen victim to akrasia, or weakness of will. Weakness of will presupposes the existence of free will and second-order choice. A person who continually is subject to his first-order desires and akrasia would have a life which lacked any sort of continuity or purpose. Rather, it would be more akin to Plato’s immoral expert who is internally fragmented by his desires which are leading him around like a carrot in front of a horse. In this situation, reason is reduced only to a calculative faculty for achieving pleasure. But there are indeed some problems with Frankfurt’s hierarchy when one asks, why are second order volitions any more free than first? For instance why not third order, fourth order, etc…
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