The Reality of Time

Each moment in the day we are continually affected by time- deadlines, meetings, and obligations all hinge around its passage. Yet, what if the passage of time we experienced was an elaborate chimera? Does time have any physical reality outside of the psychological illusion of persistence? The debate over the reality of time is significant in philosophy as shown between the difference in an “eternalist” perspective and one in which we exist “in” time in the “now” of presentism.

Eternalists, such as McTaggart, argue that nothing which exists can be said to possess the characteristic of being in time because he argues time is not a true entity. Differences between past, present, and future are only an illusion in our minds as every moment is equally real. Thus this is akin to the image of a "block universe" in which every event already exists, but the passage of time itself is reduced to a logical fiction. This is similar to Parmenides as he regards change and the flow of time as only an illusion. He argues, “Whenever we perceive anything in time… we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not…”

In contrast, presentism argues that time classifications are not permanent but rather fluid. In this case, time appears to “flow”. This “A-series” corresponds to how we normally perceive events as unfolding temporally. We exist in the “now” and are being pulled through the flow of time down the river into the future, which remains an unfinished book. This is non-reductive in the sense that time is an independent entity.

Interestingly, in the book “Fabric of the Cosmos”, Brian Greene, a prominent string theorist, effectively argues that the B-series eternalist perspective most nearly accords with Einstein’s theory of relativity and physics conception of time.

He states, due to relativity,

“If you buy the notion that reality consists of all the things in your freeze-frame mental image right now, and if you agree that your now is no more valid than the now of someone located far away in space…then reality encompasses all of the events in spacetime… Events just are. They all exist. They eternally occupy their particular point in spacetime. There is no flow.” (Fabric of the Cosmos, p. 139)

Einstein stated, “For we convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future, is only an illusion, however persistent.” (p. 139- For further reading see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk-Putnam_argument)

This is the ultimate eternalist perspective of time consisting of one loaf, equally real. The passage of time becomes once again illusion. But there is also more evidence: in physical equations, time is treated as symmetric. There is no difference between a glass falling or putting itself back together mathematically, nothing to distinguish past and future. This is known as time reversal symmetry. In physics, an arrow of time can only be distinguished by increasing entropy in a closed system from the statistically unlikely low entropy big bang. Over time, entropy and disorder tends to increase.

However, if all time is equally real, this has an important upshot: the universe then is fully deterministic and we have no free will. In the classical Newtonian machine universe, whose laws are immutably set in place, this would indeed be the case. Even in the quantum world where uncertainty has reality, “Schrodinger’s equation tells you how the wavefunction was or will be at any other moment you specify. This component of quantum physics is fully deterministic, just as in classical physics.” (Fabric of the Cosmos, p. 455) Greene notes, however, the missing piece is the controversial act of observation. Does observation cause the wavefunction to collapse? Or is science perhaps mistaken in believing that we can map mathematical laws onto such questions as free will? Perhaps the problem is trying to fit such conceptions as free will, value, subjectivity, and consciousness in the scientific framework in the first place and there are profound limitations on the human capacity to determine the true nature of reality and even ourselves. This is a subject for an entire book, or at least another post.

Is “Pushpin as Good as Poetry?" A Debate over Higher and Lower Faculties.

Are elevated faculties, which are typically associated with that which is the very characteristic of being human, such as reason, to be more prized than those natural passions and emotions? For instance, is the educated, erudite man who discovers a new theoretical theory living in such a matter consistent with the highest fruition of the good life? Or perhaps are there no such criteria?

A view which argues that reason is more valuable than natural passion presupposes, as an a priori, Platonic truth, that man has a teleological purpose. That is, there are universal normative criteria for living the good life which are already present prior to the introduction of cultural norms and sensibilities. If one adheres to a teleological view, it would then seem that pushpin is perhaps not as good as poetry if the true essence of man was defined in terms of his reasoning capabilities. This must presuppose that the highest form of good for all men is to reason. (Plato, although he would argue that functions are natural, would back away from this further claim as he would state that such functions vary in men depending on particular virtues. It perhaps may be argued that he would then only rank ways of life in relation to certain ends.)

On the other hand, this Platonic universe imbued with purpose is typically contrasted with the modern, secular notion which argues that function in the world is assigned by mankind and is in fact, for the most part, arbitrary. Existentialism, for instance, and Sartre in particular, argued that mankind surges up in the world and defines value for himself afterwards. Value is not inherent but is rather created. In short, our existence precedes our essence. This is echoed in the philosophy of John Searle who argues that functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from the outside by conscious observer. Functions are always observer relative. Thus, normativity, or the ability for things to malfunction or go wrong, is always in light of an observer. Humans impose the “ought” and the purpose onto functions where none previously existed as an “is”. This includes agentive (manifest) functions which have to do with our immediate purposes and are given by observers. For instance, when we say “This stone is a paperweight” or “This object is a screwdriver”, these are functions which we do not discover and they do not occur naturally, but rather are assigned through collective intentionality in a system of constitutive rules. (See: “The Construction of Social Reality”)

Although I disagree with him on this point, he posits that even nonagentive (latent) functions, which naturally occur, are not inherent. For instance, Searle argues that when we say “The heart functions to pump blood”, we are assigning its function relative to our own system of values, purposes, and general understanding. Our assignment is in light of the fact we value life. Searle states, “If we thought the most important value in the world was to glorify God by making thumping noises, then the function of the heart would be to make a thumping noise.” (p. 15) Thus, when we “discover” a function in nature, the discovery consists in the discovery of the causal processes together with the assignment of teleology to those processes. There are no natural facts discovered beyond causal facts.

Thus, if man assigns functions, it would seem that failure is only defined as relative to our current goals. In a universe absent of inherent purpose, there is then no way of living which is to be more prized than another. And with the introduction of such provincial criteria, comes for better or worse, post-modernism and relativity.

Concepts of Agency on the Left and Right

The concept of moral agency and freedom of the will plays a significant role in the political realm, and individuals’ political affiliation, although it is not typically considered as such. For our purposes here, I will assume that the philosophical theory of causal determinism is not true, and humans have free will of some kind. With that being said, much of the economic debate between those on the right today endorsing in general a free market “laissez faire” system, and those on the left, who support greater government regulation, I seek to argue in this post, is a disguised debate over differing concepts of agency. This dichotomy can also be seen as one which splits classical liberalism in two: between supply-siders (today called economic neoliberals) and welfare, Keynesian opposition. While both camps would agree the maximization of freedom is the essential goal in the polity, they disagree over the meaning of this objective and how to meet it. Neoliberals tend to believe in only a conception of “negative” freedom, which is freedom from government restraint. Conversely, welfare liberals tend to believe in “positive freedom” in that individuals are actually open to more possibilities to exert their true potential and conception of the good with the government’s aid.

Implicit in this debate is two very different characterizations of human nature and agency. Neoliberals, i.e. advocates of the economic policy of Reagan and Bush, rely on a conception of the person as not only autonomous, but utterly removed from any environmental constraints. That is, it is a conception of agency in which individuals must be said to be completely liable for their situation regardless of any extenuating circumstances. This concept of a pure, autonomous agent therefore holds individuals responsible for both the economic rewards they are said to earn as well as any plight they find themselves in. This indeed is the general attitude of the neoliberal or libertarian who can turn their back and say “It is their own indolence and poor behavior which resulted in their economic poverty” and there will be no government handouts. This view implies responsibility.

But this type of conception of agency, I argue, is the product of fallacious reasoning. Welfare liberals, traditional today on the left, recognize that such a conception of pure autonomy belies the fact that we are always somewhat the product of circumstance and the environment in which we were raised. We cannot therefore hold someone liable for such circumstances. This is shown by the simple fact that class mobility is relatively limited, those in the lower economic bracket are at a huge disadvantage in terms of the best education prospects which can be crucial to breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty.

Rawls recognizes that we are the product of such circumstantial factors in terms of moral desert. In general we cannot be said to deserve are native endowments, nor can we be said to be entitled that society values our particular endowments. For instance, the fact that someone is naturally tall and good at basketball does not mean that he deserves to be tall or, moreover, that the game of basketball even be in existence. (Perhaps society had created another game in which the natural attribute of being short, yet fleet-footed gained an advantage) Rawls states incredulously, “Do people think than they deserved to be born more gifted than others?” (Justice as Fairness, 74) Consider all the things we do not choose: Our economic class, our sex, our general physical attributes, our intellectual aptitude, the schooling we received, the nation in which we were born, our religion until we are old enough to question it, and so on. (It is indeed ironic that Rawls recognizes that we cannot be said to deserve such things in terms of economic distribution, but he does not find us to be situated, constitutive selves as Sandel would have it)

Thus, the fact that such things are not earned all the way down should lead to what I believe should be more significant, structured government programs to help alter the environment in which individuals in lower economic brackets are raised in order to ensure that they have the same opportunities as any other individual within society. If one admits that persons are not completely autonomous agents, and although there is room for the will, this is greatly influenced by environmental factors, then I argue this is logical. With such recognition, the persistence of such pure neoliberal and libertarian economic policies in the United States in the last Bush administration can be said to be nothing more than callousness. It is a system which praises short-term efficiency for the wealthy over long-term social justice and equal opportunity, a system which increases the growing divide between the rich and the poor, and currently an economic system which, due its rampant deregulation, is in crisis.

Philosophy and Politics

I am starting a new blog page here, dedicated exclusively to philosophical issues and political science. Most posts will reflect questions or issues within these subjects I believe are particularly engaging or otherwise important. Others may be more opinion based articles reflecting my own view. I encourage constructive criticism about the blog and comments if you wish to add to any discussion!