On Post-Modernism and Meta-Narratives

Post-Modernism, which has its origins in the works of philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche, is associated with the rejection of rationality as a means for understanding reality, giving rise to subjectivity and ‘perspectivism’. In some sense, this is also deeply Socratic as it rejects the possibility of absolute knowledge. This commonly is juxtaposed with the objectivity and order of Enlightenment thought. What characterized modernity is the belief that reality operated in ways which could be understood and brought to light by human reason. There was a sense that man could conquer nature through his faculties and scientific inquiry because the universe operated in a predictable manner. Post-Modernism rejects these claims and the base of objectivity on which they stand.

Although post-modernism is often criticized by advocates of rationalism and universalism that it collapses into moral relativity and nihilism (a critique I do not think unfair), I do think that as a movement it offers many valuable and important suggestions which aid in 1) recognizing the limitations of reason and 2) the way in which we as a collective culture impose subjective stories which masquerade as truth. The latter is referred to as a “meta-narrative”, which is defined by John Stephens as “a global or totalizing cultural narrative schema which orders and explains knowledge and experience". The post-modernist treats such overarching stories with skepticism as they are oversimplifications which are commonly used to perpetuate an existing power structure.

Put differently, this world is your world: it is shaped by our language and how we bring our language to bear on what we conceive as reality. In the process, we as a society (and in particular, those in power) create stories regarding history, society, and values. These narratives not only situate participants within a polity, they create a shared yet subjective meaning. This includes national narratives, collective symbols, and ideas which serve to build a common culture and political structure. But these stories are also subjective in the sense that they depict only one way of viewing history. They do not so much describe the past as they create a vignette or characterization of history from one vantage point. They are stories about stories, and ‘yours’ due to the fact that they lack any third-person objectivity. Throughout Anglo-American history this has had the effect of idealizing the founding fathers and marginalizing minorities, the oppressed, and divergent political systems in order to garner a collective acceptance from generation to generation. We elevate these stories to the detriment of issues such as equality, global poverty, etc.. But notice that there are other narratives that are socially constructed which form our expectations about the way the world operates, how we should act within society, and who we should be. These all comprise an invisible, yet ponderous layer upon our general understanding.

The largest meta-narrative according to the post-modernist is the myth of the triumph of universal reason and logos over chaos, the victory of science over irrationality. This is gestured towards interestingly in Nassim Taleb’s 2007 book “The Black Swan” in which he posits that we neglect rare events because we underestimate our ignorance due to the collective illusion of objective truth or knowledge given by the progress of the science. We our misled by a narrative of absolute truth, but in fact such objectivity is a fiction. This can also be best described in his sardonic style by Nietzsche in his book “Philosophy and Truth”. He writes,

“Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of the universe…there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history”…” (p.79) “What then is truth? A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding. Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions.” (p. 84)

T.S. Elliot: "Four Quartets"

This post will seek to analyze the major philosophical and religious themes in T.S. Elliot’s “Four Quartets”. Although most regard “The Wasteland” as his greatest work (and indeed it is one of the greatest of the 20th century), Elliot himself believed that “Four Quartets” perhaps surpassed it. Printed in its entirety in 1943, the poem is written mainly in free verse and ties in themes of the nature of time and the divine through metaphor and repetition. It is divided into four sections- Burnt Norton, East Coker, the Dry Salvages, and Little Gidding. What Elliot attempts to convey in the poem is a theory of the true nature of reality as eternal. Ultimately, this reveals a Christian and Platonic ontology which reflects Elliot’s own Anglican faith and is illustrated in the poem through religious imagery. He opens, “Time present and time past/ Are both perhaps present in time future/ And time future contained in time past. / If all time is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable.” Time is closely connected with the divine as it serves to represent the concept of the everlasting. Perhaps most well known is the line “In my beginning is my end” which begins East Coker, and culminating with “In my end is my beginning.” He also later states that the “End and Beginning were always there.” This seeks to reinforce the theme of perpetuity and a changeless state. And this is once again repeated throughout many other portions, such as Dry Salvages: “There is no end, but addition: the trailing/Consequence of further days and hours.”

The nature of reality is also gestured towards with the concept of logos, which was used by ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus. Heraclitus writes: “The cosmos, the same for all, none of the gods nor of humans has made, but it was always and is and shall be: an ever-living fire being kindled in measures and being extinguished in measures…Changing, it rests.” The world itself is a constant flux as symbolized by fire. Fire is always in movement but remains the same substance. Likewise, the world of experience is one of change but it is the divine which is permanent and immutable. This moves towards the ontology of Parmenides, who posited change to be only apparent. This is illustrated with the line in Burnt Norton: “At the still point of the turning world./ Neither flesh nor fleshless;/ Neither from nor towards;/ at the still point, there the dance is.” This describes a world in perpetual change due to one unmoved mover, or God. Morris Weitz states of this line, “In God is the source of movement and the temporal. Not that God is movement; rather from Him emanates movement, to utilize a neo-Platonic idea. There is the temporal, the flux; but without God, the Timeless, there would be no temporal.”

This is also seen in the fragments of Heraclitus’ work which argue that the universe was governed by a single divine law, or logos, which was common to all but recognized by only few. That being said, logos also translates as “the Word”, meaning the truth and divine. Heraclitus’ writes, ““A fool is excited by every word”. This indicates that many fail to come to realize the truth although it is evident. They become attached to numerous false dogmas or ‘words’ but never come to know God who is ‘The Word’. Elliot also mirrors this in certain portions of “Four Quartets” in the lines which states: “Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind/ Cannot bear very much reality.” The bird is used here as a messenger of the Truth, which is not recognized by most in the realm of experience. To use Plato’s allegory of the cave, when the prisoner first is released from his chains, he looks into the light of the fire and is blinded. He then would sooner doubt the reality of the fire than the previous shadows which he believed to constitute all of reality. Experience fundamentally is set out to mislead because it distracts one’s attention from the realm outside of the cave, which is the form of the good or God. Elliot writes, “We must start with the temporal, the ever-changing experience; and come to see its dependence upon the Timeless (God)”

The form of the good itself is symbolized by the sun, which like God, gives rise to all the other representations in the sensible realm. But this form of the good is ultimately indescribable and ineffable to the cave dweller, who cannot recognize it as the source of his experiences. It is only the philosopher king who is able to leave the cave who sees that his experience does “Point to one end, which is always present.” Thus, Elliot rejects the virtue of a posteriori synthetic knowledge derived through empiricism. In short: our eyes deceive us. Elliot writes, “We had the experience but missed the meaning” and in East Coker, “There is, it seems to us/At best, only a limited value/In the knowledge derived from experience./The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies.” This amounts to a rejection of the ability for scientific empirical discovery to properly discover the nature of reality. Rather, for Elliot we must submit to faith: it is only by recognizing the Word that we may find redemption.

Gradations of Free Will?

If one holds the position that God (lets assume his existence for the purposes of this post) has granted mankind free will to use as he chooses, and such free will can be used to for evil, are there gradations of sin? This can be interpreted in two ways, are certain sins given the situation more morally reprehensible than others, assuming complete free will? For example, if a person killed another out of rage and one out of self defense, would not God view the one out of self defense as importantly different than the former? This once again must presume the omnipotence of an all-powerful being which could know internal intention. Does not the intention matter when committing a crime or likewise sin?

But this question can also be interpreted as asking, with the circumstances in mind, do we not perhaps act with less than free will in many situations? Even with a rejection of a deterministic hypothesis, one must concede that we are influenced greatly by a number of causes from day to day life which ultimately impact our behavior. This includes both cultural and biological factors. (I have discussed this in previous posts) Culturally, if a specific point in history socializes a person to act in a certain way which is considered a sin, do we say that that individual is less blameworthy then one who was raised in a different situation? If so, on what basis could we say any of these circumstantial aspects make us in any way responsible for our actions? If we were raised in a culture which valued such morality then we would act within the boundaries of what was commanded. But one cannot say in seriousness that it was I that choose to act in such as way all the way down. I merely conformed to the rules given to me throughout childhood, it was not completely earned. In the Rawlsian sense, just as our innate talents and economic position at birth does not constitute a basis for a dessert, our morality which is given to us does not constitute our deserving such a moral high ground in some sense. Perhaps this leads to some deep historical questions about the culpability of groups which did not adhere to Christianity. For instance, were the ancient Greeks less blameworthy for their actions because they lived before Christ? Ignorance of the law is no excuse for action contrary to it. But it would seem intuitively that such groups cannot be admonished for acting contrary to a moral code that was not yet provided. Are we therefore held to a higher standard now we do have such a code?

Moving on to biological factors, I believe a significant charge against absolute standards of sin within Christianity is the fact that certain individuals, such as kleptomaniacs as well as psychopaths, are biologically determined to act in a way which is contrary to the law which has been commanded. But once again, in what way can any Christian say in seriousness that these people deserve any sort of punishment? It was not they who choose to live as they do, there was no choice involved. And if choice is taking away completely, then man is no longer a moral agent, instead he is an automaton which cannot act otherwise. Criminal law also recognizes this distinction in dealing with cases in which a person pleads insanity, making his actions unintentional and not morally blameworthy.

Moreover, there is another problem if we maintain the position that human beings have absolute free will. This is most readily shown in the distinction painted between nature and man. Enlightenment thought presupposed that nature and all of the animal world is subject to deterministic and causal processes, whereas man is viewed as being an exclusively special rational creature. The dilemma is this: if we hold man to be absolutely free, and we also grant that he evolved given the evidence of Darwinian selection over a period of 5 million years from apes, we must concede that there was a point that he did not have such freedom. That is, if we hold that apes' behavior is governed by causal processes which are sufficient for action, then there must be a point at which humans developed the will through evolution. It is more reasonable to assume that this process occurred, if it occurred at all (as our behavior could be caused by underlying neurological processes), incrementally then in one single step transition. This fact requires us to reconceptualize the way in which we conceive of the experience of free will, its relationship to the causal processes within nature, and the possibility of gradations of freedom. If any degree of free will does in fact exist, and we concede it developed incrementally from the causal processes of nature, then we must evaluate the possibility of gradations of freedom within the animal world as well.

The Creation of Social Identity

Existence in a world of inter-subjective meaning imposes on the person a number of societal norms which impinge on the way in which he attempts to convey his own identity. We in turn, are forced to play a role depending on the context we are in. For instance, a person who acts a certain way in situation “x” will act a completely different way in “y”, due to the various obligations and rights associated with each particular institution. In this case, the environment is the formative agent whereas the agent himself paradoxically becomes mechanical according to the rules in the particular situation. For example, we might see that a person acts a certain way in a church because the conduct in that association demands a particular demeanor, procedure, etc.. If a person in a church were not to follow such rules they might be said to soon become an outsider in that community, and if such behavior was severely deviated from the groups mandated rules and regulations, they would be claimed to be heretical and excommunicated from the church.

Notice, however, that what applies to churches also applies to other institutions in the associational realm. Certain conduct is expected under the auspices of a business, at school, and even at home. As Searle argued, society creates the introduction or rights and obligations pursuant to the type of role which you serve. And if one were to spurn the standard conduct in each of these respective institutions we would venture to say that expulsion could be the result. The question is, what remains of a coherent picture of the self from the imposition of such standards? Don’t human actors create such institutions in the first place? Or are we all really pulled along with just the illusion of free will while we float down the same stream to a predetermined fate? I must say, I do not believe the average citizen has much of a chance to affect the formation of institutions, and therefore the definition of the self in such cases is determined by the environment in which one lives.

The degree of social determinism becomes more extreme depending on the type of political philosophy in place, i.e. cultural relativism. For instance, communitarian and collective societies such as China and the theocratic regime in Iran certainly maximize the degree of environmental determinism and acculturation. Factors such as governmental control over the levers of transparency such as the press, media, and education system also play a significant role in shaping and forming citizens' perceptions of the world. Although pluralism is heightened in a free society, the relative homogeneity of American culture imposes with it a certain standard on the person which constricts the ability of the self to choose. Indeed, American civics courses teach a dialogue of "freedom" and "individualism" which become the rhetoric of choice, so we are are raised with the notion that collective societies are somehow backwards or otherwise deficient. But it can be argued that this strong belief in individualism and limited government is only another form of acculturation. By any means, our civics texts do not possess any degree of higher order impartiality but rather are value-laden and highly centered on western dominance. This has led some post-modernists to claim they are simply meta-narratives or subjective stories that we tell, only one lens of seeing history. Are democratic citizens made, or do they emerge? (Josh Miller wrote a very good senior research on this a few years ago)

“The German philosopher, Hiedeggar, has two important concepts that pertain to this discussion in a very powerful way: “thrown-ness” or “historicity” and “fallen-ness.” The former suggests that we are simply thrown into this world, a world that does not care for our desires or us. We were thrown into the bosom of our parents, into a certain culture and time period. Also, that we were simply given a certain personality and temperament. Then there is the enculturation and the indoctrination that simply “happen” to us through our parents and friends, society and media, religion and education. But, what makes human condition and existence even more horrific is the latter notion, “fallen-ness.” That is, once thrown, we fall into tasks or roles making our existence inauthentic, shallow and superficial. Even our thinking becomes calculative. We put on various masks such as being a teacher or a student, a husband or a wife, a waiter or a waitress and many others, and by falling into all sorts of roles, we lose authenticity and ourselves because we begin to identify ourselves and who we are through the masks that we wear.” (http://www.laney.peralta.edu/apps/comm.asp?Q=30570)

Persistence of the Self

Persistence of the self over time occupies one of the most interesting subjects for debate in philosophy and religion, although one which is typically taken for granted in Judeo-Christian culture. The focal point of this discussion is between ego theories (strict identity over time) juxtaposed with bundle theorists (identity is only a series of experiences). In Western culture at large most people staunchly endorse ego theories of the self. In this case, what makes the self “me” is not a series of thoughts, but rather an underlying persisting substance which is a container for thoughts. This container is what unifies my perceptions together so that I recognize not only thought, but that “I” exist. (I think, therefore I am) Put bluntly, most people regard this unified self or container as a “soul”. The questioner asks, “Who am I really?”. And the Christian answers, “What makes me myself is the eternal soul.”

But on the other side of the coin, is an equally compelling answer given by bundle theorists. Hume was the first prominent bundle theorist in Western culture who argued that the self is not composed of an underlying soul, but rather is only a series of experiences in the certain causal relation of memory. This is also the Buddhist conception of the self as part of “dependent” arising. Buddha wrote: "This bundle of elements is void of Self. In it there is no sentient being. Just as a set of wooden parts receives the name of carriage, so do we give to elements the name of fancied being. Buddha has spoken thus:...There is no Individual. it is only a name given to a set of elements."

Thus, this does not deny that there are persons, but simply argues that a person is an assemblage of sorts. Just like the carriage has no fundamental existence outside of its particular arrangement, the concept of the person depends on its parts, mind and body. We are nothing more than our brains and our bodies, but identity cannot be reduced to either. This is similar to the way the logical atomists, in the philosophy of language, seek to reduce objects to their constituent parts in order to illustrate the most fundamental substance of reality. For instance, a table does not exist as an independent entity above the way a board and a stump sit in a particular configuration. The word “table” just is what we have used to call the configuration of its parts, which then can be reduced even further. The table's existence requires "conceptuality" and therefore is nominal. Logical atomists are no doubt influenced by scientific inquiry, which attempts the same reductionism. For instance, “solidity” is simply the arrangement of molecules in a certain way, and “color” is only the refraction and absorption of certain waves of light. (Notice the scientific materialist view of the self as merely a complex machine therefore fits in well with the bundle theorist account)

Similarly, the contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit endorses the bundle theory of the self by positing that there are feelings, thoughts, experiences, and the causal relationship between them but nothing more. The fundamental question is not of identity, but rather of continuity of experience. “I think therefore I am” cannot be concluded on the basis of a concept of personhood which does not entail an underlying self. For Parfit, people are like clubs-

"Does the Maryland Philosophy Club exist as a thing in its own right? The answer would seem to be no. For there to be a Maryland philosophy club is nothing more than for there to be certain people who have decided to associate with one another for certain purposes and talk about that association in a particular way. The club has no individuality or integrity in its own right. Or again: at the moment, there is on my desk at home a rather outdated and bulky modem, on top of which is a bottle of vitamin E, an aluminum can and a bowl with a spoon and a bit of ice cream residue in it. Suppose I give this collection of objects a name, calling it "Modemess." Does "Modemess" exists? The answer is on the one hand obviously it does. There is the modem and the junk on top of it; no doubt about that. But does it exist as a genuine, unified object? Its existence is surely nominal -- that is, a result of nothing more than the separate facts about the individual objects together with the fact that I have decide to give the lot of them a single name.” (http://brindedcow.umd.edu/308x/parfit.html)

Thus, any talk of the “self” for a bundle theorist is like the carriage or club, nominal or name-only. What matters is not identity, but the psychological continuity of my memory. This has the striking result that when my memory is gone, I am literally no longer the same person. Thus if one endorses this theory, we must be prepared to say of a person who has severe Alzheimer’s that they have not only merely forgotten, but they are literally no longer themselves.

Free Will and Desire

If I follow my natural passions, I’m I acting with libertarian freedom? Suppose I am faced with a choice between eating a cheeseburger and a chicken sandwich. Without much deliberation, I recognize that I am craving the burger and this is what I choose. But was the choice one in which I was acting autonomously? In deciding I surveyed my competing desires (i.e. tastes I am craving at the present moment, the price of the item, etc…) But if my desire is caused, we cannot say that I am responsible for freely choosing. I cannot wake up today and say “I intend that my desires will be such that I will be hungry for a burger”. It is like saying “I am choosing to feel the need to go to the bathroom”. Thus, if I follow my natural desire then it appears that I am not acting freely.

If causal determinism is true, such desire is in itself caused by an infinitely long chain of antecedent events back perhaps to the hand of God leading to its inevitability. And of course, we then do not have any free will, and the word “choice” has no real meaning. Thus, someone who exhibits only these first-order desires cannot be said to be an agent in the strict sense of the word. This is because in this situation our beliefs and desires are causally-sufficient reasons for action. This would include animals, small children, perhaps the mentally insane, and those who are blind addicts. (What Frankfurt calls animals and children “wantons”)

But what if I choose the latter? I’m I acting as an agent if I choose that which goes against my desire? Suppose I choose the chicken sandwich, have I done so with absolute free will? What if I desire both equally? It would seem that freedom, at least in the compatibilist sense, is established when I override my original desire. This would be a second-order choice which supersedes my innate desire. (Or perhaps If I choose my original desire it is because of a period of self-reflection and not because I was led by a craving) In this case, my original desire is not causally sufficient for action. I have the possibility for self-reflective action. This seems to me intimately connected to the concept of duty. In such cases we resist our first-order desire by acting according to a sort of universal principle or ideal. (i.e. A priest chooses to live a life of asceticism despite innate passions) Thus, second-order desires give rise to freedom of action which leads to the possibility of morality.

Second Order Desires Can be Considered as:

“Higher-order volitions (or higher-order desire), as opposed to action-determining volitions, are volitions about volitions. Higher-order volitions are potentially more often guided by long-term convictions and reasoning. An example for a failure to follow higher-order volitions is the drug addict who takes drugs even though he would like to quit taking drugs. According to Harry Frankfurt the drug addict has established free will, in respect to that single aspect, when his higher-order volition to stop wanting drugs determines the precedence of his changing, action determining desires to either take drugs or not to take drugs. Following this definition the establishment of free will is a continual challenge with a changing degree of difficulty. This view of free will conforms with compatibilism.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Higher-order_volition)

We might say a person who then acts according to a moral law but then gives in to his desires, has fallen victim to akrasia, or weakness of will. Weakness of will presupposes the existence of free will and second-order choice. A person who continually is subject to his first-order desires and akrasia would have a life which lacked any sort of continuity or purpose. Rather, it would be more akin to Plato’s immoral expert who is internally fragmented by his desires which are leading him around like a carrot in front of a horse. In this situation, reason is reduced only to a calculative faculty for achieving pleasure. But there are indeed some problems with Frankfurt’s hierarchy when one asks, why are second order volitions any more free than first? For instance why not third order, fourth order, etc…

The Technological Pinnacle

“The truly apocalyptic view of the world is that things do not repeat themselves. It isn’t absurd, e.g., to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and that mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. It is by no means obvious that this is not how things are.” Wittgenstein

I seek to argue here the claim that the product of science-the ostensible benefits of technology- are trumped by the specter of the mass destruction which they cause. Science, in seeking objectivity, unleashes forces which not only fate man to not only ethical suicide but quite an actual one. To avoid ambiguity on the meaning of technology, I want to specifically refer to the rise of technology in the 20th century which allowed humans to change the environment at an alarming rate and harness atomic energy and micro technology. This is type of innovation is a double edged sword, and this is the technology which is cause for concern.

The benefits of technological improvement in the 20th century are clear: great interconnectedness in communications and travel, nearly instantaneous fluid interaction of ideas, and the improvement of the living standards of millions of individuals, particularly in the developed countries of the United States and Europe. It must be conceded that technology has also promoted lives which are longer and more prosperous with the advent of new medicine and procedures, which are of course, restricted mainly to the 1st world.

However, the 20th century is replete with examples of the destructive military capabilities which have been created through technological innovation, causing mass killing and genocide. This includes gunpowder, high explosives, automatic weapons, and rapid long-distance communications. During World War I, machine gun technology and bombers led to the death of 15 million. World War II- 55 million due to “total war”. Ten of the twenty highest mortality rates during war and/or genocide have occurred in the 19th/20th century, in no small part due to the increase in technological capacity. There are also estimates that 75% of all casualties in conflict since 0 B.C. have occurred in the 20th century. It is estimated that each year, over $1 trillion dollars is spent on the arms trade alone. Don’t worry; you can rest easy knowing the United States, who contributes to half of the world’s entire spending, is cashing in on those profits to contribute to our GDP.

With the introduction of nuclear armament in the post World War II era, thanks physicists such as Oppenheimer, the problem becomes even more dire. The nuclear option reaches a point of gravity that war between nuclear powers must be avoided at all costs. And indeed, this has the temporary benefit of preventing the escalation of conflict due to mutually assured destruction. But how many hundreds of years will it take for one deranged dictator or another Republic promoting a Star Wars defense shield to upset the delicate nuclear balance and the policy of deterrence and encourage a new arms race? Or worse yet, utilizing nuclear weapons as a first strike policy or minimalist nukes as an alternative to traditional bombardment (i.e. Bush's plan for "mini-nukes")?

In addition to the nuclear threat, technology poses the risk of severe global environmental problems as is the case with global warming caused by anthropogenic sources. The burgeoning production of fossil fuels has caused the emission of carbon dioxide which has perhaps irreversibly altered the environment leading to climate change. Such industrialization coupled with deforestation leads to a decrease in biodiversity, and rapid species extinction. Worldwide improvements in the overall standard of living have led to rapid increases in population growth which leads to future sustainability issues. Although such growth has slowed down significantly throughout Europe, the third world suffers from very high rates of growth and equally high under-5 mortality rates. If the exponential growth of the world eventually outruns our creative ability to adapt, a Malthusian fate is plausible. (On this point it is important to note that the alarmist projections of economist Paul Ehrlich who favors placing restrictions on reproduction have not yet occurred) Lastly, such technological adaptations have arguably created dependency issues by creating the expectation of efficiency or leisure through artificial electronic devices and severing our connection with nature and the outdoors.

I speculate here five logically possible scenarios which due to the rise of technology could lead to irreversible damage to the planet and the fate of mankind:
1) Nuclear Holocaust- This is the most likely due to the uncertainty of an anarchical international political realm with no significant central power to prevent usage.
2) Global Warming- We irreversibly alter the environment causing glacier retreat, ice shelf depletion, sea level rise, further species loss, and eventually the disruption of the food chain.
3) Genetically Engineered Supervirus- We unleash a superbug which has the ability to mutate indefinitely
4) The Singularity- Micro-technology reaches an apogee which results in machines which have the ability to self-correct exponentially until their operation is beyond human understanding. If such machines are hostile to humanity, then this is the “Terminator” scenario.
5) Brave New World Scenario- Mankind realizes that social stability can only be ensured through genetic manipulation, and in an effort to avoid nuclear war, we use eugenics to artificially create humans in test tubes who are programmed to be passive and enjoy their role in society. Steven Hawking mentions that the elimination of aggression in humans through genetic manipulation is actually necessary for mankind to survive and avoid nuclear war. There is hope yet.

The Reality of Time

Each moment in the day we are continually affected by time- deadlines, meetings, and obligations all hinge around its passage. Yet, what if the passage of time we experienced was an elaborate chimera? Does time have any physical reality outside of the psychological illusion of persistence? The debate over the reality of time is significant in philosophy as shown between the difference in an “eternalist” perspective and one in which we exist “in” time in the “now” of presentism.

Eternalists, such as McTaggart, argue that nothing which exists can be said to possess the characteristic of being in time because he argues time is not a true entity. Differences between past, present, and future are only an illusion in our minds as every moment is equally real. Thus this is akin to the image of a "block universe" in which every event already exists, but the passage of time itself is reduced to a logical fiction. This is similar to Parmenides as he regards change and the flow of time as only an illusion. He argues, “Whenever we perceive anything in time… we are perceiving it more or less as it really is not…”

In contrast, presentism argues that time classifications are not permanent but rather fluid. In this case, time appears to “flow”. This “A-series” corresponds to how we normally perceive events as unfolding temporally. We exist in the “now” and are being pulled through the flow of time down the river into the future, which remains an unfinished book. This is non-reductive in the sense that time is an independent entity.

Interestingly, in the book “Fabric of the Cosmos”, Brian Greene, a prominent string theorist, effectively argues that the B-series eternalist perspective most nearly accords with Einstein’s theory of relativity and physics conception of time.

He states, due to relativity,

“If you buy the notion that reality consists of all the things in your freeze-frame mental image right now, and if you agree that your now is no more valid than the now of someone located far away in space…then reality encompasses all of the events in spacetime… Events just are. They all exist. They eternally occupy their particular point in spacetime. There is no flow.” (Fabric of the Cosmos, p. 139)

Einstein stated, “For we convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future, is only an illusion, however persistent.” (p. 139- For further reading see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk-Putnam_argument)

This is the ultimate eternalist perspective of time consisting of one loaf, equally real. The passage of time becomes once again illusion. But there is also more evidence: in physical equations, time is treated as symmetric. There is no difference between a glass falling or putting itself back together mathematically, nothing to distinguish past and future. This is known as time reversal symmetry. In physics, an arrow of time can only be distinguished by increasing entropy in a closed system from the statistically unlikely low entropy big bang. Over time, entropy and disorder tends to increase.

However, if all time is equally real, this has an important upshot: the universe then is fully deterministic and we have no free will. In the classical Newtonian machine universe, whose laws are immutably set in place, this would indeed be the case. Even in the quantum world where uncertainty has reality, “Schrodinger’s equation tells you how the wavefunction was or will be at any other moment you specify. This component of quantum physics is fully deterministic, just as in classical physics.” (Fabric of the Cosmos, p. 455) Greene notes, however, the missing piece is the controversial act of observation. Does observation cause the wavefunction to collapse? Or is science perhaps mistaken in believing that we can map mathematical laws onto such questions as free will? Perhaps the problem is trying to fit such conceptions as free will, value, subjectivity, and consciousness in the scientific framework in the first place and there are profound limitations on the human capacity to determine the true nature of reality and even ourselves. This is a subject for an entire book, or at least another post.

Is “Pushpin as Good as Poetry?" A Debate over Higher and Lower Faculties.

Are elevated faculties, which are typically associated with that which is the very characteristic of being human, such as reason, to be more prized than those natural passions and emotions? For instance, is the educated, erudite man who discovers a new theoretical theory living in such a matter consistent with the highest fruition of the good life? Or perhaps are there no such criteria?

A view which argues that reason is more valuable than natural passion presupposes, as an a priori, Platonic truth, that man has a teleological purpose. That is, there are universal normative criteria for living the good life which are already present prior to the introduction of cultural norms and sensibilities. If one adheres to a teleological view, it would then seem that pushpin is perhaps not as good as poetry if the true essence of man was defined in terms of his reasoning capabilities. This must presuppose that the highest form of good for all men is to reason. (Plato, although he would argue that functions are natural, would back away from this further claim as he would state that such functions vary in men depending on particular virtues. It perhaps may be argued that he would then only rank ways of life in relation to certain ends.)

On the other hand, this Platonic universe imbued with purpose is typically contrasted with the modern, secular notion which argues that function in the world is assigned by mankind and is in fact, for the most part, arbitrary. Existentialism, for instance, and Sartre in particular, argued that mankind surges up in the world and defines value for himself afterwards. Value is not inherent but is rather created. In short, our existence precedes our essence. This is echoed in the philosophy of John Searle who argues that functions are never intrinsic to the physics of any phenomenon but are assigned from the outside by conscious observer. Functions are always observer relative. Thus, normativity, or the ability for things to malfunction or go wrong, is always in light of an observer. Humans impose the “ought” and the purpose onto functions where none previously existed as an “is”. This includes agentive (manifest) functions which have to do with our immediate purposes and are given by observers. For instance, when we say “This stone is a paperweight” or “This object is a screwdriver”, these are functions which we do not discover and they do not occur naturally, but rather are assigned through collective intentionality in a system of constitutive rules. (See: “The Construction of Social Reality”)

Although I disagree with him on this point, he posits that even nonagentive (latent) functions, which naturally occur, are not inherent. For instance, Searle argues that when we say “The heart functions to pump blood”, we are assigning its function relative to our own system of values, purposes, and general understanding. Our assignment is in light of the fact we value life. Searle states, “If we thought the most important value in the world was to glorify God by making thumping noises, then the function of the heart would be to make a thumping noise.” (p. 15) Thus, when we “discover” a function in nature, the discovery consists in the discovery of the causal processes together with the assignment of teleology to those processes. There are no natural facts discovered beyond causal facts.

Thus, if man assigns functions, it would seem that failure is only defined as relative to our current goals. In a universe absent of inherent purpose, there is then no way of living which is to be more prized than another. And with the introduction of such provincial criteria, comes for better or worse, post-modernism and relativity.

Concepts of Agency on the Left and Right

The concept of moral agency and freedom of the will plays a significant role in the political realm, and individuals’ political affiliation, although it is not typically considered as such. For our purposes here, I will assume that the philosophical theory of causal determinism is not true, and humans have free will of some kind. With that being said, much of the economic debate between those on the right today endorsing in general a free market “laissez faire” system, and those on the left, who support greater government regulation, I seek to argue in this post, is a disguised debate over differing concepts of agency. This dichotomy can also be seen as one which splits classical liberalism in two: between supply-siders (today called economic neoliberals) and welfare, Keynesian opposition. While both camps would agree the maximization of freedom is the essential goal in the polity, they disagree over the meaning of this objective and how to meet it. Neoliberals tend to believe in only a conception of “negative” freedom, which is freedom from government restraint. Conversely, welfare liberals tend to believe in “positive freedom” in that individuals are actually open to more possibilities to exert their true potential and conception of the good with the government’s aid.

Implicit in this debate is two very different characterizations of human nature and agency. Neoliberals, i.e. advocates of the economic policy of Reagan and Bush, rely on a conception of the person as not only autonomous, but utterly removed from any environmental constraints. That is, it is a conception of agency in which individuals must be said to be completely liable for their situation regardless of any extenuating circumstances. This concept of a pure, autonomous agent therefore holds individuals responsible for both the economic rewards they are said to earn as well as any plight they find themselves in. This indeed is the general attitude of the neoliberal or libertarian who can turn their back and say “It is their own indolence and poor behavior which resulted in their economic poverty” and there will be no government handouts. This view implies responsibility.

But this type of conception of agency, I argue, is the product of fallacious reasoning. Welfare liberals, traditional today on the left, recognize that such a conception of pure autonomy belies the fact that we are always somewhat the product of circumstance and the environment in which we were raised. We cannot therefore hold someone liable for such circumstances. This is shown by the simple fact that class mobility is relatively limited, those in the lower economic bracket are at a huge disadvantage in terms of the best education prospects which can be crucial to breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty.

Rawls recognizes that we are the product of such circumstantial factors in terms of moral desert. In general we cannot be said to deserve are native endowments, nor can we be said to be entitled that society values our particular endowments. For instance, the fact that someone is naturally tall and good at basketball does not mean that he deserves to be tall or, moreover, that the game of basketball even be in existence. (Perhaps society had created another game in which the natural attribute of being short, yet fleet-footed gained an advantage) Rawls states incredulously, “Do people think than they deserved to be born more gifted than others?” (Justice as Fairness, 74) Consider all the things we do not choose: Our economic class, our sex, our general physical attributes, our intellectual aptitude, the schooling we received, the nation in which we were born, our religion until we are old enough to question it, and so on. (It is indeed ironic that Rawls recognizes that we cannot be said to deserve such things in terms of economic distribution, but he does not find us to be situated, constitutive selves as Sandel would have it)

Thus, the fact that such things are not earned all the way down should lead to what I believe should be more significant, structured government programs to help alter the environment in which individuals in lower economic brackets are raised in order to ensure that they have the same opportunities as any other individual within society. If one admits that persons are not completely autonomous agents, and although there is room for the will, this is greatly influenced by environmental factors, then I argue this is logical. With such recognition, the persistence of such pure neoliberal and libertarian economic policies in the United States in the last Bush administration can be said to be nothing more than callousness. It is a system which praises short-term efficiency for the wealthy over long-term social justice and equal opportunity, a system which increases the growing divide between the rich and the poor, and currently an economic system which, due its rampant deregulation, is in crisis.

Philosophy and Politics

I am starting a new blog page here, dedicated exclusively to philosophical issues and political science. Most posts will reflect questions or issues within these subjects I believe are particularly engaging or otherwise important. Others may be more opinion based articles reflecting my own view. I encourage constructive criticism about the blog and comments if you wish to add to any discussion!