Gradations of Free Will?

If one holds the position that God (lets assume his existence for the purposes of this post) has granted mankind free will to use as he chooses, and such free will can be used to for evil, are there gradations of sin? This can be interpreted in two ways, are certain sins given the situation more morally reprehensible than others, assuming complete free will? For example, if a person killed another out of rage and one out of self defense, would not God view the one out of self defense as importantly different than the former? This once again must presume the omnipotence of an all-powerful being which could know internal intention. Does not the intention matter when committing a crime or likewise sin?

But this question can also be interpreted as asking, with the circumstances in mind, do we not perhaps act with less than free will in many situations? Even with a rejection of a deterministic hypothesis, one must concede that we are influenced greatly by a number of causes from day to day life which ultimately impact our behavior. This includes both cultural and biological factors. (I have discussed this in previous posts) Culturally, if a specific point in history socializes a person to act in a certain way which is considered a sin, do we say that that individual is less blameworthy then one who was raised in a different situation? If so, on what basis could we say any of these circumstantial aspects make us in any way responsible for our actions? If we were raised in a culture which valued such morality then we would act within the boundaries of what was commanded. But one cannot say in seriousness that it was I that choose to act in such as way all the way down. I merely conformed to the rules given to me throughout childhood, it was not completely earned. In the Rawlsian sense, just as our innate talents and economic position at birth does not constitute a basis for a dessert, our morality which is given to us does not constitute our deserving such a moral high ground in some sense. Perhaps this leads to some deep historical questions about the culpability of groups which did not adhere to Christianity. For instance, were the ancient Greeks less blameworthy for their actions because they lived before Christ? Ignorance of the law is no excuse for action contrary to it. But it would seem intuitively that such groups cannot be admonished for acting contrary to a moral code that was not yet provided. Are we therefore held to a higher standard now we do have such a code?

Moving on to biological factors, I believe a significant charge against absolute standards of sin within Christianity is the fact that certain individuals, such as kleptomaniacs as well as psychopaths, are biologically determined to act in a way which is contrary to the law which has been commanded. But once again, in what way can any Christian say in seriousness that these people deserve any sort of punishment? It was not they who choose to live as they do, there was no choice involved. And if choice is taking away completely, then man is no longer a moral agent, instead he is an automaton which cannot act otherwise. Criminal law also recognizes this distinction in dealing with cases in which a person pleads insanity, making his actions unintentional and not morally blameworthy.

Moreover, there is another problem if we maintain the position that human beings have absolute free will. This is most readily shown in the distinction painted between nature and man. Enlightenment thought presupposed that nature and all of the animal world is subject to deterministic and causal processes, whereas man is viewed as being an exclusively special rational creature. The dilemma is this: if we hold man to be absolutely free, and we also grant that he evolved given the evidence of Darwinian selection over a period of 5 million years from apes, we must concede that there was a point that he did not have such freedom. That is, if we hold that apes' behavior is governed by causal processes which are sufficient for action, then there must be a point at which humans developed the will through evolution. It is more reasonable to assume that this process occurred, if it occurred at all (as our behavior could be caused by underlying neurological processes), incrementally then in one single step transition. This fact requires us to reconceptualize the way in which we conceive of the experience of free will, its relationship to the causal processes within nature, and the possibility of gradations of freedom. If any degree of free will does in fact exist, and we concede it developed incrementally from the causal processes of nature, then we must evaluate the possibility of gradations of freedom within the animal world as well.