A Critique of the Classical Model of Rationality

In his novel “Rationality in Action”, Searle attempts to expose the fundamental weaknesses within the dominant theory of reason in the Western tradition while positing an alternative which supports a self as an autonomous agent. This topic has partially been discussed in my post involving Frankfurt’s second order desires. However, Searle’s work would benefit from a more thorough description which contrasts the Classical Model with his revisionist account.

His main points are summarized as follows:
1) The Classical Model, which holds that rational actions are caused by beliefs and desires, fails to account for the experience of the gap between intentional states and the decision itself. We cannot simply sit back and let the causes act upon you. Rather, you must choose a reason upon which to act. What fills the gap? In a Sartrean style he states, “Nothing. Nothing fills the gap”. (p.17) On the contrary, typically only irrational actions contain a set of beliefs and desires which are causally sufficient reasons for acting, such as when a person is in a grip of an addiction.

2) Rationality is not a separate faculty but rather is tantamount to possessing capacities for language, thought, and intentionality. You can only have rationality where there is the possibility of being irrational. Similarly, only a moral agent has the possibility of being immoral. That is, only an agent who had the possibility to do otherwise where is actions were not causally determined. Thus, a clinically insane person is removed from standards of moral assessment precisely because he is no longer in control of his behavior.

3) Weakness of will is a common feature of rationality which cannot be accounted for under the Classical Model where the causes of an action set up sufficient conditions for its completion. This is a feature of the gap which is due to the possibilities open to the agent.

4) Contrary to the Classical Model, there are desire-independent reasons for acting. This is what sets us apart from Chimpanzees. Under the original model, agents must appeal to a desire in their current motivational set for acting. However, this has the absurd consequence that no one can have a reason for acting unless they currently have an intentional state for such action. Thus, in the case of a smoker who has a desire to smoke cigarettes, it is perfectly rational under the Classical Model to do so even with the recognition that the behavior will likely result in early death and such a smoker will not want to suffer this fate. (p.129) In short, the Classical Model cannot account for forward planning and evaluation.

5) Unlike the Classical Model which holds that one must have a set of compatible desires, Searle shows that it is common to have incompatible and conflicting desires and it is in fact the task of practical reason to reconcile. The real difficulty is determining what you really want to do. In contrast, the Classical Model is simply means to ends reasoning. The desires are assumed to be consistent and the task is determining ends for satisfaction.

For Searle, rationality then must require a robust and irreducible notion of the self. He states, “Neither a Humean bundle nor a Strawsonian “person” having both mental and physical properties, nor even a Frankfurt-style person who has second-order desires about his first-order desires is by itself sufficient to account for agency.” (p. 91)

Moreover, the capacity for language is essential as assertives, directives, and commissives (promises) involved in speech acts are necessary for desire- independent reasons for action. Searle argues that inherent to the structure of such speech acts is normativity. This is because nearly all speech acts involve a commitment of some sort and have the possibility of going wrong. He argues, “The world does indeed consist of facts that are largely independent of us, but once you start representing those fact, with either direction of fit, you already have norms, and those norms are binding on the agent. All intentionality has a normative structure.” (p.182) Assertions, such as the statement, “The cat is on the mat” commits the speaker to the truth of the statement and has a propositional content which has conditions of satisfaction in the world. The principle “You ought to tell the truth” is internal to the notion of an assertion; there is no gap between the statement and a commitment to truth. Similarly, the speech act of promising is a commitment to future action. The obligation and normative structure is internal to the speech act itself. Why? An insincere promise is only intelligible in light of the understanding that a promise is binding upon an agent. He states, “Once I have made a promise, it is not open to me to say, “Yes, I made the promise, but I do not see why that places me under an obligation.” Similarly, if I said “It is raining, it is not open to me to say, “Yes, I said that but I do not see why that constitutes making a statement.” (p.179) The importance of this fact is that the Classical Model treats obligation as external from promising, thereby making it impossible for an agent to act under the concept of duty separate from desire. In Searle’s view speech acts such as promises create desire-independent reasons for acting which function as a form of external motivator. In this case, the reason (obligation) acts as the source of the desire, rather than the desire functioning as a cause of action.